I do not propose to answer the question whether the adequacy of the restriction is outside the scope of Article 27 of the Law on Contracts and, for the purposes of the present case, I shall consider that it is not intended to examine the relevance of the restriction provided for in Article 27. From this point of view, Indian courts should not consider two issues, as in England, but only whether or not the treaty is explicit in the marketplace. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act cancelled all pro-tanto trade restriction agreements, with the sole exception of the sale of exploitable property or goodwill. However, it is important to understand that these agreements are non-illegal. In other words, these agreements are not illegal, but they cannot be brought to justice if one of the parties does not fulfill its part of the agreement. Unlike customary law, partial agreements aimed at restricting trade or appropriately restricting under the Contracts Act are also not valid. A business restriction contract is a contract stipulating that a person who sells a business undertakes not to open a similar transaction at a certain distance from the business to be sold and for a specified period of time. In accordance with section 26 of the Indian Contract Act, all agreements to restrict marriage, with the exception of that of a minor, are null and void. The Romans were the first to delegitimize the agreements that hold back marriage. The basis for the nullity of agreements limiting marriage is that marriage is a sacrament and should not intervene in the institution of marriage, not even in treaties.
The idea behind this provision is not to deprive everyone of the personal right to marry someone of their choice. It is important to note that, in accordance with the section “Agreements limiting the marriage of a minor”, the provisions are void. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the terms of an agreement should not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the other party from remedying it. To be a valid trade restriction, both parties must have provided valuable consideration as to the applicability of their agreement. In the Dyer case[3], a dyer had granted an obligation not to operate in the same city as the applicant for six months, but the applicant had not promised anything in his favour. When Hull J heard the plaintiff`s attempt to impose this reluctance, he exclaimed, “By God, if the plaintiff were there, he would have to go to jail until he paid a fine to the king.” In this case, two owners of similar businesses agreed, in partnership, that only one of their plants would operate at a time and that the profits would be shared between them. This reluctance was considered valid. Here, the complainant owned a fleet of buses that once ran between Pune and Mahabaleshwar. The defendant also had a similar case in the same area. In order to avoid competition, the applicant purchased the defendant`s business together with the goodwill and contractually committed it not to open a similar store in the region for 3 years. The accused did not do so and resumed his belongings. The Tribunal decided that the agreement was valid since it fell within the exception of S.27.
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